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Comments

I

Are They Listening? The Current Debate
over Municipal Liability Under the Federal
Wiretap Act

Jenna M. Maresco*
ABSTRACT

The Federal Wiretap Act ("FWA") prohibits the interception and
disclosure of electronic communications. The FWA contains a civil
remedy provision through which a victim may recover from a "person or
entity" alleged to have violated the statute. The somewhat ambiguous
text of the FWA has led to varying interpretations of the civil remedy
provision among courts.
Specifically, courts have disagreed over whether a municipality can
be deemed an "entity" for purposes of the civil remedy provision. Most
courts have held that a municipality is an "entity" and thus can be held
liable for violations of the FWA. A few courts, however, have reached
the opposite result. All courts addressing this issue have reached their

* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University,
2015.
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respective conclusions based on an interpretation of the statutory text and
legislative intent.
This Comment will first examine the history of wiretapping in the
United States and its early legal ramifications. This Comment will then
discuss the current circuit split regarding municipal liability under the
FWA. This Comment concludes that a municipality can and should be
held liable for its violations of the FWA, which comports with the
FWA's general goal and traditional notions of the right to privacy. Not
only does the statute's language and congressional history support this
conclusion, but the doctrine of respondeat superior also serves as a
secondary legal theory justifying municipal liability under the FWA.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

"The senators kept asking about the martini glass.... This was an
actual martini glass? They would ask. Oh, yes, with an olive as a
microphone and the toothpick as the antenna, I would answer."' In 1965,
a well-known private investigator, Hal Lipset, appeared before a Senate
subcommittee to speak on the topic of electronic eavesdropping. 2 He
shocked the world by secretly recording the subcommittee hearing,
unbeknownst to most of the Senators and reporters present.3 Although
Lipset's performance made the pervasive use of bugging devices public
knowledge, 4 wiretapping originated over a century earlier.5
Wiretapping has been in existence "for as long as oral
communications have been transmitted over wires. ' ,6 Protections against
wiretapping, however, date back to the early foundations of the nation. 7
At common law, eavesdropping, or "listen[ing] under walls or windows,
or the eaves of a house," was a punishable offense, though rarely
prosecuted.8 As technology improved, the use of wiretapping steadily
increased, as did the protection against it. 9
With the advent of the telegraph and telephone, wiretapping became
nearly effortless and quite common.10 Not only did government officials
use wiretapping to apprehend criminals, but criminals also used this
surreptitious tool to operate widespread illegal operations." Private
detectives used wiretaps as part of their daily work. 12 Newspapers and

1. PATRICIA HOLT, THE BUG IN THE MARTINI OLIVE AND OTHER TRUE CASES FROM
THE FILES OF HAL LIPSET, PRIVATE EYE 68 (1st ed. 1991).

2. Id. at 65.
3. See id at 69.
4. See id at 67, 69.
5. See GINA STEVENS &

CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-326,
PRIVACY: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL STATUTES GOVERNING WIRETAPPING AND
ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING 1-2 (2012) (citation omitted) (discussing the origins of

wiretapping and the current law on the topic generally).
6. Howard J. Kaplan et al., The History and Law of Wiretapping, 2012 SECTION OF
LITIG. ANNUAL CONFERENCE 2 (2012) (providing a brief history of wiretapping and its
current use in an insider trading investigation).
7. See STEVENS & DOYLE, supra note 5.
8. See id.
9. See Kaplan et al., supra note 6; David H. Price, A Social History of Wiretaps,
COUNTERPUNCH (Aug. 9-11, 2013), http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/08/09/a-socialhistory-of-wiretaps-2/.
10. Price, supra note 9.
11. Andrew Ayers, Note, The Police Can Do What? Making Local Government
Entities Payfor Unauthorized Wiretapping, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 651, 652 (2003)
(discussing the various amendments to the Crime Control Act and the issue of municipal
liability under the FWA).
12. Kaplan et al., supra note 6.
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businesses tapped the wires
of their competitors to gain an advantage in
13
their respective markets.
As states recognized the rampant use of wiretaps, they slowly began
to adopt anti-wiretapping laws.' 4 On the federal level, however,
prohibitions against wiretapping took longer to enact. 5
Today,
electronic eavesdropping is federally regulated by the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act 16 ("Crime Control Act") and its various
amendments. 17
In particular, the amendment
enacting the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 198618 ("ECPA") implements the
Federal Wiretap Act' 9 ("FWA"), which protects against the illegal
interception and distribution of electronic communications that are in
transmission.' ° The FWA provides a civil remedy against any "person or
entity, other than the United States," who violates the FWA. 21 Courts are
divided as to whether an "entity" can include a municipality for purposes
of the civil remedy provision.22 Thus, while the Sixth Circuit and a
majority of lower courts have held that a municipality can be held liable
under the FWA,2 3 24other courts, namely the Seventh Circuit, have reached
a divergent result.
This Comment will analyze the current circuit split regarding
municipal liability under the FWA for illegally intercepting, disclosing,
and using electronic communications. 25 Part II of this Comment will
26
discuss the origins of wiretapping and the applicable law on this topic,
as well as introduce the current circuit split.27 Part II will also examine
the doctrine of respondeat superior and its application to municipal
liability under the FWA.28

13.
14.

Id.; Ayers, supra note 11.
Kaplan et al., supra note 6.

15.

See STEVENS & DOYLE, supra note 5, at 2.

16. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§
801-802, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
17.

See id

18.

Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.

1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
19. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2012). The FWA is also commonly referred to as

Title 1II. This Comment, however, will consistently refer to the statute as the FWA.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See id.
Id. § 2520.
See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part

II.B.
II.B.1.
I1.B.2.
II.B.
II.A.
II.B.
II.C.
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Part III of this Comment will argue that municipalities can and
should be held liable for violations of the FWA, as the Sixth Circuit30
correctly decided. 29 Without this protection, the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement becomes meaningless and the right to privacy of
many individuals can be freely violated with little redress. 3' Part III will
also explain how the FWA's text, the statute's legislative history, and the
legal doctrine of respondeat superior support municipal liability under
the statute.3 2 In addition, this Part will show that municipal liability
under the statute comports with the general statutory goal of encroaching
on an individual's right to privacy only when necessary to achieve a
legitimate law enforcement objective.33 Finally, Part IV will conclude
with a summary of the issues discussed throughout this Comment.34
II.

THE BACKGROUND OF WIRETAPPING AND THE CURRENT CIRCUIT
SPLIT REGARDING MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER THE

FWA

As law enforcement's use of wiretapping and other forms of
electronic surveillance became both advanced and pervasive, Congress
acted to ensure that individuals were protected from unreasonable search
and seizure.3 5 Thus, Congress passed the Crime Control Act, which was
36
later amended to add the FWA and Stored Communications Act
("SCA").37 Both the FWA and the SCA protect against the illegal use
and disclosure of an individual's electronically stored information.38
Similarly,39 both statutes provide a remedy in cases where the statutes are
violated.
These remedy provisions, however, have caused much debate
among the federal courts when it comes to their application against
municipal units.40 In particular, the Sixth Circuit has held that a

29.

30.
31.

See infra Part III.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

See Gary L. Davis, Note, Electronic Surveillance and the Right of Privacy, 27

MONT. L. REV. 173, 192 (1966) (discussing the privacy right implicated by electronic

eavesdropping).
32. See infra Part III.A-C.
33. See infra Part III.D.
34. See infra Part IV.
35. See STEVENS & DOYLE, supra note 5, at 5.
36. Stored Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100 Stat. 1848, 186068 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2701-2712 (2012)).
37. See STEVENS & DOYLE, supra note 5, at 5-6.
38. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2701 (2012).
39. See id. §§ 2520, 2707.
40. Compare Seitz v. City of Elgin, 719 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134
U.S. 692 (2013) (finding that municipalities should not be held liable under the FWA),
with Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 2001) (deciding that
municipalities can be held liable under the FWA).
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municipality can be held liable for a violation of the FWA,4 1 while the
Seventh Circuit has held otherwise.42 Despite the fact that the theory of
respondeat superior can be used to hold municipalities liable for
violations of the FWA, most courts' reasoning has stemmed from the
FWA's text, legislative history, and early notions of privacy.4 3
A.

The Legal History of Wiretapping
1.

Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence and Its Early Application to
Wiretapping Cases

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was the first piece
of legal jurisprudence to regulate government surveillance of
individuals."a The Fourth Amendment safeguards individuals from
government actions that constitute "unreasonable searches and seizures"
of their physical body, home, and possessions.4 5 When courts initially
applied the Fourth Amendment to wiretapping, they found that a
defendant's rights had been violated only if government officials had
physically trespassed onto a defendant's property in order to obtain an
electronic communication.46 Advanced technology, however, enabled
government officials to obtain information without physically trespassing
onto property and to thereby circumvent the definition of a "search"
under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.47
Without an effective ban on electronic eavesdropping, government48
officials persisted in the use of wiretapping as a law enforcement tool.
At the same time, the public became increasingly concerned about the
government's extensive use of wiretapping and the lack of protection

41. Adams, 250 F.3d at 985.
42. Seitz, 719 F.3d at 660.
43. See Seitz, 719 F.3d at 656-60; Adams, 250 F.3d at 985-86.
44. SARAH BOUCHER ET AL., INTERNET WIRETAPPING AND CARNIVORE 4 (2001),
available at
http://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/classes/6.805/student-papers/springO 1papers/carnivore.doc.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
46. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (finding that the
defendant's Fourth Amendment claim failed because there had been no "search" of his
home or "seizure" of his belongings when government officials wiretapped his telephone
conversations without physically trespassing onto his home or office and used the
incriminating information obtained to convict him of conspiracy to violate the National
Prohibition Act).
47. See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942) (holding that the
use of a detectaphone to overhear a conversation in an adjacent office was not a violation
of the Fourth Amendment because there was no physical trespass onto the defendant's
property); BOUCHER ET AL., supra note 44.
48. E.g., BOUCHER ET AL., supra note 44.
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afforded against government encroachment on privacy. 49 As technology
progressed, however, this trespass-based jurisprudence was slowly
nullified, and courts and legislatures responded to the conflicting views
of the public and law enforcement agencies.5 °
The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, slowly expanded its
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to include protection against
intrusions made without a physical trespass where the object of the
search or seizure was an intangible communication. 51 State legislatures
also responded by enacting statutes they anticipated would comply with
the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.5 2 When the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down one of the most comprehensive of these
statutes in the case of Berger v. New York, 53 Congress realized
the need
54
for a more comprehensive statute regulating wiretapping.
The Court's decision in Berger served as a catalyst that prompted
the federal government to enact the Crime Control Act in 1968." s In
passing the Crime Control Act, Congress sought to strike a balance
between preventing government officials from abusing electronic
communications and preserving wiretapping as an important law
enforcement tool.56 Since then, Congress has continued to update the

49. E.g., id at 5.
50. See STEVENS & DOYLE, supra note 5, at4.
51. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (rejecting the argument that
the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated because there was no
physical intrusion into the bugged phone booth that he was using to transmit gambling
information to various cities in violation of a federal statute).
52. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., art. 27, § 125A(c) (1957) (repealed 1976); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 813-a (1958) (repealed 1968).
The Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement reads, "and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
53. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Upon reports of officials in the state
liquor authority taking bribes, the District Attorney's office applied to the State Supreme
Court for a court order permitting the wiretapping of specific state officials' phones. Id.
at 45. The information obtained from the wiretaps was then used to convict the defendant
of conspiracy to bribe liquor authority officials. Id. at 44. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme
Court addressed the validity of the statute authorizing the eavesdrop order and concluded
that it was overly broad and failed to comply with certain Fourth Amendment
requirements, such as providing a description of the place to be searched and the
conversations to be seized. Id. at 44.
54. S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N 2112, 2156;
STEVENS & DOYLE, supra note 5, at 5.
55. STEVENS & DOYLE, supra note 5, at 5.
56. See id.
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Crime Control Act to comply with these objectives in a constantly
changing society.57
Several amendments to the Crime Control Act are especially
relevant to the current circuit split. For example, in 1986, Congress
amended the Crime Control Act to add the ECPA in response to modem
technological advancements, specifically the growing use of computers.5 8
The ECPA, in part, revises the FWA and implements the SCA-the
parallel provision regarding civil relief for the interception of stored
communications.59
2.

The Federal Wiretap Act

The FWA prohibits "any person" from intercepting, disclosing, or
using any "wire, oral, or electronic communication., 60 The FWA defines
a "person" as, "any employee, or agent of the United States or any State
or political subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership,
association, joint stock company, trust, or corporation. ' '61 Inaddition, the
statute allows for government wiretapping under court order where there
is probable cause to believe that the wiretap will lead to evidence of a
crime 62 or the whereabouts of a wanted fugitive. 63 The FWA also
provides for a civil remedy in cases where the statute is violated.6 4
The current debate over municipal liability under the FWA stems
from the language of the statute's civil remedy provision, § 2520.65
Section 2520 provides for the recovery of civil damages against the
"person or entity, other than the United States," that commits a violation
of the statute.6 6 Section 2520 originally provided for recovery only
against a "person" but was later amended to say "person or entity., 67 In

57. See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
§§ 101-201, 100 Stat. 1848, 1848-68 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18 U.S.C.).
58. See id.; see also S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N
3555,3555.

59. §§ 101-201, 100 Stat. at 1848-68.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2012).

61. Id. § 2510(6).
62. Id. § 2516. On the federal level, the electronic surveillance must lead to
evidence of one of a specifically enumerated list of crimes. Id. § 2516(1). In the state
context, the electronic surveillance must provide proof of a "felony under the state laws
covering murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, drug trafficking, or
any other crime dangerous to life, limb, or property." Id. § 2516(2).
63. Id. § 2516(l)().
64. Id.§ 2520.
65. Ayers, supra note 11, at 683.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a).
67. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 103,
100 Stat. 1848, 1853-54 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a)).
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2001, § 2520 was again amended when Congress enacted the USA
Patriot Act, 68 which added the phrase "other than the United States" to
the text of § 2520.69 The addition of the phrase "other than the United
States" essentially excludes the federal government as an "entity" from
which an individual can recover civil damages when suing for a violation
of the FWA. 70 Both amendments adding language to the statute changed
the text of§ 2520 of the FWA and § 2707 of the SCA.7 1
3.

The Stored Communications Act

The SCA is a section of the ECPA that parallels the FWA in many
respects, and thus, despite differences, the two provisions are commonly
compared.72 Unlike the FWA, which protects electronic communications
when they are in transmission, the SCA protects electronic
communications in their "stored" form. 73 Section 2701 of the SCA states
that "whoever" intentionally accesses without authorization or exceeds
access with authorization to a stored communication is in violation of the
the term
SCA.74 The term "whoever" used in § 2701 differs from
"person" used in the parallel provision of the FWA, § 251 1.75
In addition, the accompanying legislative history to the SCA sheds
light on Congress's intent regarding municipal liability. 76 Similar to the

FWA, § 2707 of the SCA also contains a provision that allows for
recovery of civil damages from "any person or entity, other than the
United States" that violates the SCA.77 The legislative history, however,
shows that the term "entity" under § 2707 is meant to be inclusive of
government units, unlike the similar provision in the FWA where the
legislative history is silent on the issue.78

68. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 201(a)()-(b)(l), 115 Stat. 272,
293 (2001) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2520, 2707 (2012)).
69. Id. The FWA now reads, "any person whose wire, oral, or electronic
communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter
... may in a civil action recover from the person or entity, other than the United States,
which engaged in that violation." 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (emphasis added).
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a).
71. §§ 201(a)(1)-(b)(1), 115 Stat. 272 at 293.
72. See, e.g., Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 2001).
73. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(2), with 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1)-(2). An electronic
communication in its "stored" form includes, for example, e-mail or voicemail messages.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a).
75. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (using the term "whoever" to describe the being that
can violate that provision), with 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (using the term "person" to describe
the being that can violate that provision).
76. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 43 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
3597.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a).
78. S.REP.No. 99-541,at 43.
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Government officials will undoubtedly continue to use various
forms of electronic eavesdropping to pursue law enforcement goals,
despite gaps in the laws regulating such conduct. Thus, courts are faced
with the task of reconciling differences between such laws, like the FWA
and the SCA, and applying these statutes to a myriad of issues. One of
these issues is the question of municipal liability for violations of the
FWA.
B.

The Current CircuitSplit RegardingMunicipalLiability Under the
FWA

Currently, only two circuits have had the opportunity to consider the
issue of municipal liability under the FWA. 79 Those two circuits,
however, have reached divergent results.
While the Seventh Circuit
concluded that municipalities cannot be potentially liable parties under
the FWA,81 the Sixth Circuit has ruled to the contrary.
1.

Adams v. City ofBattle Creek83: The Sixth Circuit Holds that
Municipalities Can Be Held Liable Under the FWA

The Sixth Circuit found in Adams that a police officer whose
communications were intercepted by his superiors could recover against
the city for its violation of the FWA.84 In Adams, the city police
department "cloned"85 the pager of Officer Adams so that it could
monitor his messages to determine whether he was aiding local drug
traffickers, as his superiors suspected. 86 Upon discovery of the
monitoring, Officer Adams brought suit against the city alleging a
violation of the FWA. 87
The court in Adams concluded that

79. See Seitz v. City of Elgin, 719 F.3d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134

U.S. 692 (2013); Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 2001).
80. Compare Seitz, 719 F.3d at 657 (concluding that municipalities cannot be held

liable under the FWA), with Adams, 250 F.3d at 985 (finding that municipalities can be
held liable under the FWA).
81.
82.

Adams, 250 F.3d at 985.
Seitz, 719 F.3d at 657.

83. Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980 (6th Cir. 2001).
84. Id.
at 985.
85. Individual pagers each have a "cap code," which is a multi-digit number that
"the pager looks for in the stream of paging messages before it locks onto a message and
notifies its wearer."
Pager, Fax, and Data Intercept Techniques,
http://textfiles.com/hacking/intercpt.txt (last visited Oct. 11, 2013). A "cloned" pager has

the same cap code and frequency as the original pager. Id. Thus, when a message is sent,
both pagers receive that message at the same'time. Id.
86. Adams v. City of Battle Creek, No. 1:98-CV-233 1999 WL 425885, at *1 (W.D.
Mich. Apr. 28, 1999).

87. Id.

2015]

ARE THEY LISTENING?

municipalities can be held liable for violations of the FWA. 8 In its
analysis of municipal liability, the court looked to various indicators of
congressional intent and statutory construction."
Specifically, the Adams court examined the statute's text, legislative
history, and case law concerning the issue. 90 Because the statute's
definition of a "person" sheds no light on the issue of municipal liability,
the Adams court turned its focus to the term "entity" in § 2520 of the
FWA. 9 1 The court inferred congressional intent to hold municipalities
liable for violations of the FWA from the 1986 amendment adding the
term "entity" to the statute. 92 The court concluded that the term "entity"
must mean a government entity because "prior to the 1986 amendments,
Thus, the
the definition of 'person' already included business entities.
addition of the term "entity" would have been repetitive if it were simply
meant to include the type of business entities already referred to in the
definition of "person. 94 Analogous amendments to similar provisions
within the ECPA bolster this reasoning. 95
The court supported its view by analyzing identical changes made
to the SCA by the 1986 amendments.96 The court noted the addition of
the term "entity" to the parallel provision of the SCA governing possible
civil liability for the unlawful interception of stored communications.9 7
The legislative history for this amendment of the SCA "specifically
states that the word 'entity' includes governmental entities. 98 Thus, the
court used Congress's clear intent regarding municipal liability under the
SCA to infer that Congress had the same intent under the parallel
provision of the FWA. 99

88. Adams, 250 F.3d at 985. The court also concluded that: (1) the exceptions to
liability for both the "ordinary course of business" and "law enforcement use" did not
apply in this case; (2) the Fourth Amendment issue would not be examined on appeal;
and (3) Jeffrey Kruithoff, the then-Deputy Chief of Police, should not receive qualified
immunity because the factual record is unclear as to Kruithoff's role in authorizing the
electronic eavesdropping. Id.at 983, 986-87. These holdings, however, are not central
to the theme of this Comment, which will focus solely on the court's holding in regards
to municipal liability.
89. Id.at 985.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Adams, 250 F.3d at 985.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Adams, 250 F.3d at 985. (citing S. REP. No. 99-541, at 43 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3597).
99. See id
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A majority of lower courts have used this reasoning when faced
with the question of whether a municipality can be held liable under the
FWA. 00 Other federal district courts have expanded on thiis analysis and
provided further rationale justifying municipal liability.°10 Some courts
have found that the 2001 amendment is especially insightful in regards to
Congress's intent regarding municipal liability under the FWA. 0 2 For
example, the court in Williams v. City of Tulsa'0 3 reasoned that Congress
most likely believed that government units could be held liable under the
FWA after the 1986 amendments adding the term "entity.'

14

If

Congress did not have this belief, according to the court, it would have
had no reason to exempt the United States from potential liability in the
16
2001 amendment. 1°5 In Garza v. Bexar Metropolitan Water District,0
the court also concluded that "[t]here would have been no reason for
Congress to carve out an exception for the United States [in the 2001
amendment] if governmental entities could not be sued under the
statute."'0 7 While the majority of courts have held that municipalities
can be held civilly liable for08violations of the FWA, a small number of
courts have held differently.'
2.

Seitz v. City of Elgin'0 9: The Seventh Circuit Concludes that
Municipalities Cannot Be Held Liable Under the FWA

In Seitz, the court approached the issue of municipal liability
differently than the Sixth Circuit and reached the opposite conclusionthat municipalities are not subject to civil liability under the FWA. 110 In
Seitz, Officer Welter accessed the Law Enforcement Agencies Data
System to do research for his property management company-a wholly
personal venture."' In doing so, he violated Illinois's policy for use of
100. See, e.g., Connor v. Tate, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 2001 (N.D. Ga. 2001); PBA
Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge Police Dep't, 832 F. Supp. 808, 822-23 (D.N.J. 1993).
101. See, e.g., Garza v. Bexar Metro. Water Dist., 639 F. Supp. 2d 770, 774 (W.D.
Tex. 2009); Williams v. City of Tulsa, 393 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1132-33 (N.D. Okla.
2005).
102. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 101.
103. Williams v. City of Tulsa, 393 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (N.D. Okla. 2005).
104. Id. at 1132-33 (internal citation omitted).
105. Id.
106. Garza v. Bexar Metro. Water Dist., 639 F. Supp. 2d 770 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
107. Id. at 774 (internal citation omitted).
108. See, e.g., Seitz v. City of Elgin, 719 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
134 U.S. 692 (2013).
109. Seitz v. City of Elgin, 719 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 U.S. 692
(2013).
110. Id. at 660.
111. Id. at 655. Officer Welter had used the database to research cars parked in front
of the properties that he managed. Id.
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the database. 1 2 Officer Welter then communicated information obtained
from the database via e-mail to Debra Seitz, his business partner."l 3 An
anonymous letter allegedly sent by fellow police officers conveyed the emails to city officials, prompting a misconduct investigation of Officer
Welter. 1 4 Seitz and Welter commenced suit against the City of Elgin
alleging various claims, including violations of both the FWA and the
SCA. 1 5 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit included an in-depth discussion
of municipal liability under the FWA116and affirmed the district court's
dismissal of all claims against the city.
In Seitz, the court focused its reasoning on the plain text and
legislative history of the FWA. 117 When amending the FWA to add the
phrases "entity" and "other than the United States," Congress did not
make clear whether either of these additions meant that Congress
supported municipal liability." 8 Without legislative guidance on the
purpose of these amendments, the court analyzed the plain text of the
statute." 9
The court noted that the definition of a "person" under the statute
In support of this
does not specifically include municipalities. 120
argument, the court looked to the Senate Report of the original bill,
which states that "[t]he definition explicitly includes any officer or
employee of the United States or any State... [o]nly the governmental
units themselves are excluded.' 12' Thus, the court reasoned that there is
no basis for the belief that municipalities should be held liable under the
FWA today when Congress did not originally intend to include
government units as "person[s]" under the statute. 122 Moreover, the court
stated that Congress failed to make any change in its intent clear through
its further amendments of the statute. 123 Absent clear legislative history
112. Id. Illinois permitted the database to be used only for "criminal justice
purposes." Id.
113. Id. at 655.
114. Seitz, 719 F.3d at 655. The facts underlying this case show that Officer Welter's
wife was the fellow officer who exposed Welter's e-mails. Harry Hitzeman, Former
Elgin Cop Sues Chief Others Alleging Forced Retirement, DAILY HERALD, Aug. 29,

To expose
2012, http://www.dailyherald.com/article/20120829/news/708299610/print/.
Welter's e-mails, she conspired with a fellow policeman, Officer Beeter, with whom she
was having an affair. Id.
115. Seitz, 719 F.3d at 655.
116. Id. at655-56,660.
117. Id.at656-58.
118. Id. at 656 (internal citation omitted).
119. Id.at 655.
120. Seitz, 719 F.3d at 655.
121. Id. at 656 (citing Amati v. City of Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952, 1001 (7th Cir.
1999)); S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 61 (1968), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2179.
122. Seitz, 719 F.3d at 656.
123. Id.
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regarding the issue of municipal liability, the Seventh Circuit addressed
the reasoning of courts that have
inferred congressional intent from the
24
FWA's various amendments. 1
The Seitz court failed to accept the arguments of the Sixth Circuit
that the addition of the terms "entity" and "other than the United States"
to § 2520 conclusively showed Congress's intent to hold municipalities
liable under the FWA.125 The Seitz court instead reasoned that § 2520 is
akin to 42 U.S.C. § 1983126 in that it "creates no substantive rights," but
rather, "provides a cause of action to vindicate rights identified in other
portions of the FWA.' ' 127 Under this reasoning, the court examined
§2511(1)(c)-(d) of the FWA-the provisions that the defendant
allegedly violated.128 The court found that, because § 2511 (1) prohibits
"any person" from violating the statute, § 2520 can only protect "against
actions taken by a 'person' as defined in the statute," which does not
include a municipality.129 Despite its firm reasoning,
the court also
130
recognized potential criticism of its interpretation.
The court rejected the notion that its reasoning "read 'entity' out of
the statute" and rendered the term meaningless under the FWA.''
Rather, the court concluded that substantive rights against an "entity" are
protected in § 2511(3)(a) of the FWA.132 Section 2511(3)(a) states that a
"person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the
public shall not intentionally divulge the contents of any
communication" to anyone other than the intended recipient.'
Thus, the
court concluded that an individual can use § 2520 to obtain civil relief
against an entity
when that individual alleges that the entity violated
34
2511(3)(a).1
§
The court found further support for this reading of the FWA in the
1986 amendments, which added § 2511 (3)(a) to the statute-the same
amendments that added the term "entity" to § 2520.13 According to the
court, if Congress did not add the term "entity" to § 2520 as part of the
1986 amendments, a party would have been able to recover only from an

124.
125.
126.
127.
2012)).
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.at 657.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
Seitz, 719 F.3d at 657 (citing Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 611 (7th Cir.
Id. at 658.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 659.
Seitz, 719 F.3d at 658-59.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a) (2012).
Seitz, 719 F.3d at 658-59.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
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individual, not an entity, even though
§ 251 1(3)(a) specifically states that
1 36
an entity can violate the statute.
The Seventh Circuit stated that the Adams court failed to address
whether § 2520 created substantive rights, 13' and thus, incorrectly
compared § 2520 to § 2707 of the SCA. 138 The substantive provision of
the SCA, § 2701, uses the term "whoever" to describe the entities that
can violate the statute. 139 The language of § 2701 is different from that
140
of § 2511, which specifies that only a "person" can violate the FWA.
legislative
Thus, according to the Seventh Circuit, using the SCA's 41
1
improper.
is
FWA
the
under
intent
Congress's
history to show
C. Respondeat Superiorand Its Application to the Issue of Municipal
Liabilityfor Violations of the FWA
Most courts have turned to an analysis of the legislative intent and
statutory text to decide whether a municipality can be held liable under
the FWA. 142 These courts, however, have neglected to apply the
longstanding legal theory of respondeat superior to the issue 14' even
though the doctrine can provide a further legal basis for plaintiffs seeking
relief under the FWA.144
Under the theory of respondeat superior, "[a]n employer is subject
to liability for torts committed by employees while acting within the
scope of their employment." 145 The conduct of an employee is within the
scope of employment when the employee's action: (1) is the kind of

136. Id.at 659.
137. Id.
138. Id.at 659-60.
139. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2012); Seitz, 719 F.3d at 659.
140. Seitz, 719 F.3d at 659-60.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., id at 656-60; Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 985-86
(6th Cir. 2001).
143. In fact, it may be that plaintiffs have failed to plead the theory of respondeat
superior when seeking a civil remedy under the FWA. This notion is, however, no more
than speculation. Nevertheless, the fact remains that few courts have addressed this
theory in the context of municipal liability under the FWA.
144. See Bodunde v. Parizek, No. 93 C 1464, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7365, at *4
(N.D. Ill. May 27, 1993) (applying the theory of respondeat superior to a case in which
the plaintiff alleged municipal violation of the FWA). Note that Bodunde was later
dismissed because Bodunde, a pro se plaintiff, was unable to prove that Parizek was in
fact an officer employed by the local police department. Bodunde v. Parizek, 108 F.3d
1379, 1379 (7th Cir. 1997). Therefore, the district court's rationale regarding respondeat
superior and municipal liability was not reviewed. The district court's rationale can
nevertheless be applied in future cases of municipal liability under the FWA.
145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006). Respondeat superior is also
commonly referred to as vicarious liability, and the two terms will be used
interchangeably throughout this Comment.
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work that is typical of his or her duties and responsibilities as an
employee; (2) "occurs substantially within the authorized time and space
limits;" (3) is at least partially completed to serve the interests of the
employer; and (4) if force is used, is the type of force that the employer
could expect. 146 While this framework clearly applies to negligent
actions of an employee, the application of vicarious liability to
intentional torts committed during the scope of employment is somewhat
less clear, particularly when the tort does not involve physical harm. 47
The Restatement states that an employer can be held liable for the
intentional torts of its employees. 148 Courts, therefore must decide when
an intentional tort falls within the scope of employment. 149 Most courts
still require a determination as to whether an intentional tort was one that
the employee was hired to complete or, at least partially, furthered the
,employer's interests.15 0
While the doctrine of vicarious liability is commonly applied in
cases of private employers and their employees, its application to cases
of governmental employers is somewhat different. 151 Individuals seeking
to hold a government employee liable for violations of their
constitutional rights must bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.52 A § 1983
claim can be made only against an individual, acting on behalf of the
state, whose actions are "made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law.' 53 In Monell v. Department of
Social Services,' 54 the U.S. Supreme Court
clarified a government unit's
155
liability when faced with a § 1983 suit.
Under Monell, the theory of respondeat superior cannot be used to
hold a government unit liable in the context of a § 1983 suit. 5 6 In other
words, the Court clarified that "a municipality cannot be held liable
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).
147. See Michael J. Sartor, Respondeat Superior,IntentionalTorts, andClergy Sexual
Misconduct: The Implications of Fearing v. Bucher, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 687, 704
(2005).
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 245 (1958).
149. Sartor, supra note 147.
150. Id. at 705. Some courts have concluded that it is not necessary to find that the
employee was acting with a motive to serve his employer in committing an intentional
tort during the scope of employment. Id. Those courts that have abandoned this
requirement, including those in both Minnesota and California, analyze whether there
was a "causal nexus" between the intentional action and the employment relationship. Id.
at 707 (citation omitted). A "causal nexus" is an intentional action that can be deemed
"an outgrowth of the employment relationship" and foreseeable by the employer. Id.
151. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
153. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
154. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
155. Id. at 691.
156.

Id.
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solely because it employs a tortfeasor.' ' 157 Rather, a government entity
can be held liable under § 1983 only when a municipal policy or custom
that directly causes the constitutional violation of an individual's rights is
in place.158
Despite Monell's seemingly prohibitive holding, some courts have
concluded that there is no reason that the doctrine of respondeat superior
should not apply to municipal liability for violations of the FWA.159 For
instance, in Bodunde v. Parizek,160 the court said that "no language in §
2520 [] indicate[s] that liability of the governmental entity must be based
on any principle other than the agent-principal relationship that supports
respondeat superior liability."' 61 The court added that there is no reason
to impose the policy or custom standard of § 1983 because "[t]hat
standard is based on the very language of § 1983. ' 'i62
Similarly, the court in Tapley v. Collins'63 agreed that "simple
respondeatsuperior principles" can be used to hold a municipality liable
under § 2520 of the FWA. 16 4 Thus, the idea that a municipality can be
held vicariously liable for the actions of its employees in violating the
FWA is a plausible notion. 165 Nevertheless, some courts have likened
superior
§ 2520 to § 1983 in concluding that the theory of respondeat
66
cannot be used to impose liability on a government entity.
In Davis v. Zirkelbach,167 the Seventh Circuit imposed limitations
on the doctrine of respondeat superior when applied to municipal liability
under the FWA.168 The court stated that in a cause of action under
§ 2520, as under § 1983, an "entity" should be held vicariously liable for
the actions of its employees only when "it has a policy or practice that
makes it reasonable to attribute the violation to the entity.' 69 The Davis
157.
158.
THE

Id.
Id.; Jon Loevy, Section 1983 Litigation in a Nutshell: Make a Case Out of It!,
JOURNAL

OF

THE

DUPAGE

COUNTY

BAR

ASSOCIATION,

http://www.dcbabrief.org/vol 171004art2.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2015).
159. See Tapley v. Collins, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1380 (S.D. Ga. 1999); Bodunde v.
May 27, 1993).
Parizek, No. 93 C 1464, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7365, at *12 (N.D. I11.
160. Bodunde v. Parizek, No. 93 C 1464, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7365, at *1 (N.D.
May 27, 1993).
I11.
161. Id. at*12.
162. Id. (internal citation omitted).
163. Tapley v. Collins, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (S.D. Ga. 1999), rev'd, 211 F.3d 1210
(1 th Cir. 2000) (reversed on the grounds that: (1) the court did not have jurisdiction to
review an interlocutory appeal from the city regarding the denial of their motion, and (2)
a qualified immunity defense is not precluded under the FWA).
164. Id. at 1380 (internal citation omitted).
165. See id.; Bodunde, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7365, at *12.
166. See, e.g., Davis v. Zirkelbach, 149 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 1998).
167. Davis v. Zirkelbach, 149 F.3d 614 (7th Cir. 1998).
168. Id.at 619.
169. Id.(internal citation omitted).
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court concluded that this was consistent with Monell, which held that
under § 1983, a municipality cannot be liable under a respondeat superior
theory of liability unless an "action pursuant to official municipal
policy.., caused a constitutional tort.' 170 The court in Davis determined
that the language in § 2520 and § 1983 is "sufficiently similar" to
warrant application of Monell to the FWA. 17 ' The two provisions,
however, have
distinct language and therefore, should each be analyzed
72
differently. 1
Although electronic eavesdropping and the applicable law has
evolved over the past century, the purpose of the FWA has remained
clear:
to protect both individual privacy and the goals of law
enforcement officials. 173 In order to balance these competing interests,
74
courts have the duty to ensure that one does not outweigh the other.
Holding a municipality liable for violations of the FWA would ensure
that the government's interest in law enforcement would not overshadow
individual privacy interests. 75 Thus, despite the Seventh Circuit's ruling
to the contrary, the Sixth Circuit's decision finding municipal liability
under the FWA is correct.
III.

THE ARGUMENT

FOR MUNICIPAL

LIABILITY UNDER THE

FWA

In the future, courts that are faced with the issue of municipal
liability under the FWA should adopt the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit.
Support for the Sixth Circuit's conclusion can be found in the FWA's
plain text and its legislative history. 176 More generally, the Sixth
Circuit's holding satisfies the statute's overall purpose. 177 The theory of
respondeat superior also serves as support for municipal liability under
the FWA.'78

170. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
171. Davis, 149 F.3d at 619.
172. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (stating that recovery is available when a
government official acts "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage" that "causes" a constitutional violation), with 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012) (stating
that recovery is available from any "person or entity, other than the United States" who
violates the statute, whether or not the official is acting pursuant to a custom or the
custom causes the deprivation of rights).
173. S.REP. No.90-1097 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N 2112, 2153.
174. See Davis, supra note 31, at 175-77.
175. See id.
176. See infra Part III.A-B.
177. See infra Part III.D.
178. See infra Part III.C.
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The PlainLanguage of the FWA Supports MunicipalLiability
Under the Statute.

Courts begin the analysis of a statute by examining the text of the
statute itself.179 The text of the FWA makes clear that interpreting
§ 2520 to prohibit municipal liability not only would be inconsistent with
the commonly accepted definition of an "entity" but also would create a
redundancy within the statute.180
The term "entity" is typically
understood to include a government unit.181 Black's Law Dictionary
defines an "entity" as "[a]n organization (such as a business or
government unit) that has a legal identity apart from its members or
owners. 9182 Non-legal dictionaries also define an "entity" in nearidentical terms: "an organization (as a business or governmental unit)
that has an identity separate from those of its members., 183 Furthermore,
those dictionaries that do not specifically reference governmental units in
the definition of "entity" contain such a broad definition of the term as to
make it impossible to definitively exclude a governmental unit. 184 Thus,
it would be logical to conclude that the natural understanding of the term
"entity" includes a governmental unit. 185 Not only is the common
186
definition of "entity" supportive of municipal liability under the FWA,
but it is necessary 187
to interpret the statute in such a way as to avoid
repetition.
irrational
Interpreting the term "entity" to refer only to business units would
create a redundancy within the FWA. 188 Before Congress enacted the
1986 amendments, § 2520 only allowed individuals to recover from a

179. E.g., Barnhart v. Sigman Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) ("[l]n all statutory
construction cases, we begin with the language of the statute."); Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) ("[T]he starting point for
interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself."); YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 2
(2008) (discussing the rules of interpretation most commonly applied by the U.S.
Supreme Court).
180. E.g., Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 2001).
181. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 553 (7th ed. 1999); MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entity (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).

182.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

553 (7th ed. 1999).

183. MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entity
(last
visited Nov. 4, 2013).
184. BALLENTNE'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969), availableat LEXIS (defining an
"entity"
as
"[a]
real
being;
existence");
OXFORD
DICTIONARIES,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/entity?q=entity (last visited Nov. 4,
2013) (defining an "entity" as "a thing with distinct and independent existence").
185. See sources cited supra note 184.
186. See sources cited supranote 184.
187. See, e.g., Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 2001).
188. E.g., id.
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"person" who allegedly violated the statute. 189 At that time, and still
today, the FWA definition of a "person" included business units.190 In
1986, however, Congress amended the statute to allow an individual to
recover from not only a "person" but also an "entity" under § 2520.191
As the court in Adams rightly stated, the added term "entity" must refer
to government units, otherwise the phrase would be redundant
considering the fact that the term "person" already includes business
units. 192 This reading of the statute comports with the general principle
that courts should "'avoid rendering superfluous' any statutory language"
so as to make every word meaningful. 193 If the term "entity" were meant
to refer only to business units, § 2520 would be read as providing relief
1 94
from a "business entity or entity other than the United States."'
Reading the civil remedy provision this way is illogical. 95 Moreover,
there is no evidence showing Congress intended for § 2520 to contain
such repetitive phrasing. 96 Thus, the only logical inference for the
amendment is that Congress intended to provide for a civil remedy
against municipal units.' 97
The Seitz court was incorrect when it concluded that the term
"entity" in § 2520 is solely meant to provide a civil remedy for violations
of § 2511 (3)(a) of the FWA. 198 It was not necessary for Congress to add
the term "entity" to § 2520 only because § 251 1(3)(a) permits an "entity"
to violate the statute. Even without the addition of the term "entity" to
§ 2520, an individual could recover from a unit providing "an electronic
communication service to the public" because these entities are likely
business , , 199
units, which are already included in the definition of a
''person.

Moreover, there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that
Congress intended for an alleged violation of § 2511 (3)(a) to be the only
avenue of relief against an entity. If an individual could recover only
from an entity alleged to have violated § 251 1(3)(a), an individual would
189. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §
802, 82 Stat. 197, 267 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2012)).
190. § 802, 82 Stat. at 255.
191. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 103,
100 Stat. 1848, 1853-54 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a)).
192. Adams, 250 F.3d at 985.
193. KIM, supra note 179, at 12 (citing Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino,
501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991)).
194. Ayers, supra note 11, at 691.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See Adams, 250 F.3d at 985.
198. See Seitz v. City of Elgin, 719 F.3d 654, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
134 U.S. 692 (2013).
199. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a) (2012).
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be limited to recovering from an "entity providing an electronic
The Seventh Circuit's
communication service to the public., 200
conclusion necessarily leaves individuals with no redress against any
entity other than, for example, their cell phone carrier.
In reality, individuals should have a remedy against the various
other types of entities, including municipalities, that could violate the
FWA. Nothing in the legislative history suggests otherwise.20 1 Like the
plain text of the FWA, the legislative intent also shows that municipal
entities can be held civilly liable under the FWA.
B.

The Legislative History of the FWA Supports MunicipalLiability
Under the Statute.

While Congress has not made its position on municipal liability
under the FWA explicitly clear, there are various indications that
Congress intends to hold municipalities liable under the FWA. 20 2 For
instance, the legislative history accompanying § 2707 of the SCA states
Congress's intent to include municipalities within the ambit of that
provision. 20 3 This stated intention implies that Congress contemplated
municipal liability under the ECPA more generally, including under the
FWA.2 °4 Although § 2707 and § 2520 vary in some respects, comparing
the two provisions is rational. 0 5
The Seitz court erroneously concluded that § 2520 in the FWA and
§ 2707 in the SCA should not be compared. 0 6 The Seitz court stated that
in a civil action for an alleged violation of § 2511, an individual cannot
recover from an "entity" under § 2520. 2007 Instead, the court stated that
§ 2520 protects only the substantive rights created in § 2511 and thus,
guards solely against actions taken by a "person., 20 8 The substantive
provision in the SCA, however, uses the term "whoever" instead of
"person," which, according to the Seventh Circuit, broadens the scope of
the rights protected. 20 9 For this reason, the Seitz court concluded that the
legislative history of a
Sixth Circuit "inappropriately consulted the
210
FWA.
the
parallel
truly
not
does
that
statute

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
See Seitz, 719 F.3d at 656 (internal citation omitted).
See, e.g., Adams, 250 F.3d at 985.
S. REP. No. 99-541, at 43 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3597.
Ayers, supra note 11, at 694.
Id. at 692.
See Seitz, 719 F.3d at 659-60.
Id. at 659.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 659-60.
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While the two provisions do not "truly parallel" each other because
they use different terms,21 the meaning of the two terms used is
essentially the same. 212 For instance, the Dictionary Act213 provides the
exact same definition for both terms.21 4 The term "whoever," used in
§ 2707, is commonly defined as "the person or people who; any person
who" 21 5 and "whatever person". "no matter who. ,216 The term "person" is
in fact used to define "whoever., 21 7 Accordingly, the terms have the
same meaning for purposes of statutory interpretation.
While one could conclude, as the Seventh Circuit did, that the term
"whoever" is broader than "person," the difference in breadth of the two
terms is miniscule. 21 8 Thus, the terms are nearly identical in meaning for
purposes of comparing their legislative histories. 21 9 The Seventh
Circuit's fabricated difference between the two statutes is, therefore,
unwarranted.
Furthermore, the lack of legislative history concerning Congress's
intent regarding municipal liability under the FWA cannot be dispositive.
Most precedential cases concerning municipal liability under the FWA
were decided no earlier than 1990.220 The amendment adding the term
"entity" was enacted in 1986.221 Therefore, the issue of municipal
liability was likely not yet disputed under the FWA at the time of the
211. See Seitz, 719 F.3d at 659-60.
212. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
213. Id. The Dictionary Act is rarely used in practice, but it is still important to show
Congress's intended relationship between the terms "person" and "whoever."
214. Id. The Dictionary Act says that "the words 'person' and 'whoever' include
corporations, companies, associations, finns, partnerships, societies, and joint stock
companies, as well as individuals." Id.
215.

OXFORD

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/whoever?q-whoever
Jan. 4, 2014).
216.

DICTIONARIES,

(last visited

MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/whoever

(last

visited Jan. 4, 2014).
217. See
id.;
OXFORD
DICTIONARIES,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/whoever?q=whoever (last visited
Jan. 4, 2014).
218. See Seitz v. City of Elgin, 719 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134
U.S. 692 (2013).
219. See I U.S.C. § 1.
220. See, e.g., Seitz, 719 F.3d 654; Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980 (6th
Cir. 2001); Abbott v. Vill. of Winthrop Harbor, 205 F.3d 976 (7th Cir. 2000); Amati v.
City of Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952 (7th Cir. 1999). Most lower court cases concerning
municipal liability were also decided no earlier than 1990. See, e.g., Garza v. Bexar
Metro. Water Dist., 639 F. Supp. 2d 770 (W.D. Tex. 2009); Williams v. City of Tulsa,
393 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (N.D. Okla. 2005); Connor v. Tate, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (N.D.
Ga. 2001); Dorris v. Absher, 959 F. Supp. 813 (M.D. Tenn. 1997); Bodunde v. Parizek,
No. 93 C 1464, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7365 (N.D. Ill. May 27, 1993).
221. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 103,
100 Stat. 1848, 1853-54 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a)).
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amendment and thus, prompted no action from Congress on the matter. 222
It is also possible that Congress failed to explicitly clarify its intent in
223
later amendments because it did not feel the need to do so.

Nevertheless, congressional intent can still be found in many of the
legislature's subsequent amendments of the FWA.
That the 2001 USA Patriot Act added the phrase "other than the
United States" to § 2520 of the FWA reinforces the notion that Congress
believed municipalities could be held liable under the FWA. 224

If

Congress did not believe that a government unit could be held liable as
an "entity" under § 2520 of the FWA, there would be no reason to
exempt the United States from the scope of the statute.225 Similar to the
FWA's amendments, the theory of vicarious liability also bolsters the
argument
that a municipal unit can be held liable for violations of the
22 6
FWA.

C.

The Theory of Respondeat Superior Supports Holding
MunicipalitiesLiablefor Violations of the FWA.

Although the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected vicarious liability as
a theory of liability under § 1983,227 the theory of respondeat superior is
nevertheless a viable option for holding a municipality liable for its
employees' violations of the FWA.228 While the Seventh Circuit in
Davis stated that the language in § 2520 is "sufficiently similar" to that
of § 1983 to warrant applying the policy or custom principle
established
229
in Monell, the language of each statute is actually unique.
The language of § 1983 makes clear that not only must a
government official act pursuant to a custom, but that custom must also
"cause" the deprivation of an individual's rights to be actionable. 230 The

222. See KIM, supra note 179, at 20 (stating that in some cases, statutory "silence may
reflect the fact that Congress has not considered an issue at all").
223. See id. (stating that some instances of congressional silence, "signifty] merely an
expectation that nothing more need be said in order to effectuate the relevant legislative
objective").
224. See Garza, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 774; Williams, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 1132-33; see
also Ayers, supra note 11, at 694.
225. See Garza, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 774 (internal citation omitted); Williams, 393 F.
Supp. 2d at 1132-33.
226. See Bodunde v. Parizek, No. 93 C 1464, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7365, at *12
(N.D. Ill. May 27, 1993).
227. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
228. See Bodunde, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7365, at *12.
229. Davis v. Zirkelbach, 149 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 1998).
230. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, 692. The text of § 1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,regulation,custom, or usage, of
any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States.. . to
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Monell court used this statutory language to conclude that under § 1983,
Congress did not intend for a municipality to be held vicariously liable
for its employees' actions solely because of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship.23' Instead, the employee must act
or custom in order to impose vicarious liability
pursuant to some policy
32
on a municipality.

The language of § 2520, however, is markedly different than that of
§ 1983.233 Section 2520 is devoid of any language showing that
Congress intended for an individual to recover only from an actor alleged
234
to have violated the FWA while acting pursuant to a custom or policy.
Nor is there any "cause" requirement within the text of § 2520.235 Thus,
the policy or custom standard is inextricably linked to the text of § 1983
and cannot be transferred to a different statute, namely § 2520, that does
not include similar language.2 36
Even if a court analyzes the issue under the framework for
respondeat superior and intentional torts, municipal liability for
violations of the FWA is not precluded. In many situations, a city
employee's violation of the FWA will be an intentional tort, which will
require a court to analyze whether the tortious act occurred within the
scope of employment.237 Courts will have to decide whether the
violation of the FWA was an employee's required task or whether the
employee acted to further the employer's interests.238 It is not impossible
to imagine a situation where the case facts show that a city employee
intentionally acted to further the municipality's goals. 239 Furthermore,
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (emphasis added).
231. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
232. Id. at 690.
233. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (stating "[e]very person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects ... any citizen
of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights . .. shall be liable to the party
injured .... ), with 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2012) (stating "any person whose wire, oral, or
electronic communication is intercepted ... may in a civil action recover from the person
or entity, other than the United States which engaged in that violation ... .
234. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520.
235. See id.
236. See Bodunde v. Parizek, No. 93 C 1464, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7365, at *12
(N.D. Ill. May 27, 1993). In addition, it is logical to conclude that a municipality, which
acts only through its employees, should be held vicariously liable for the illegal actions of
those employees, especially considering that individuals have always been prohibited
from violating the FWA. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs at 5, Seitz v. City of Elgin, 719 F.3d
654 (7th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-1045).
237. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006).
238. Sartor, supra note 147.
239. In Adams, for example, employees of the local police department cloned the
plaintiffs pager to monitor his communications when they suspected him of aiding drug
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using the doctrine of vicarious liability to hold a municipality liable for
violations of the FWA protects an individual's right to be free of
government intrusions, a main goal of the Crime Control
unreasonable
40
2

Act.

D.

Municipal Liability Under the FWA Comports with Traditional
Notions of Privacyand the General Statutory Goal.

An individual's right to privacy has long been protected by various
constitutional provisions. 241 In the Fourth Amendment context, the U.S.
Supreme Court has said that the Amendment protects "individual privacy
against certain kinds of governmental intrusions. 2' 42 In enacting the
Crime Control Act, Congress sought to further protect this basic privacy
right.243 An individual's right to privacy has been recognized as an
important priority, which encourages the conclusion that courts are
justified in holding a municipality accountable when it disregards this
right by illegally intercepting an individual's electronic communications.
Even in situations where a governmental intrusion into privacy is
warranted, there are added safeguards to ensure that the intrusion is
essential. 24
The goal of protecting privacy is often balanced against the reality
that in some instances, government encroachment upon an individual's
privacy is necessary to accomplish valid law enforcement interests.2 45 In
such circumstances, the FWA allows a government official to obtain a
warrant authorizing a specified form of electronic eavesdropping.2 46 One
of the purposes of requiring a detailed warrant is to ensure that the
government infringes on an individual's right to privacy only when it is
crucial to do SO. 2 4 7 Furthermore, the warrant requirement has been
traffickers. Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 982 (6th Cir. 2001). A court
could easily conclude that the actions of the police officers in cloning Adams's pager
without a warrant, and thus in violation of the FWA, was a task either assigned as part of
the job, or completed in order to further the municipality's interest in catching corrupt
employees and upholding justice.
240. See S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 2153 (1968).
241. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding that a
married couple's right to privacy regarding the use of contraception is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462
(1958) (stating that the First Amendment protects the "freedom to associate and privacy
in one's associations").
242. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
243. S.REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N 2112, 2153.
244. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2516 (2012).
245. STEVENS & DOYLE, supra note 5, at 1.
246. 18 U.S.C. § 2516.
247. See United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 758 (3d Cir. 1982) (outlining five
purposes served by the warrant requirement, including: (1) to ensure that there is
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considered the "centerpiece of the law of search and seizure," and
judicial approval of warrants is "the heart of citizens' protection against
police overreaching., 248 Thus, allowing a municipality to circumvent the
warrant requirement and escape liability when it has encroached upon a
person's privacy rights does nothing more than encourage future
violations
and condone behavior that has long been proscribed in this
24 9
country.

When the competing interests of individuals and government units
become unbalanced, there are often remedies to correct the inequity that
results.2 50 The civil remedy provision of the FWA is one such
measure. 25 1 In order to fully compensate a victim whose privacy
interests have been violated by the government's illegal interception of
an electronic communication, it is logical to conclude that Congress
would have intended for that individual to have a legitimate
avenue of
252
relief against any being that committed that violation.
Moreover, allowing an individual to obtain civil relief only from
another individual may not provide effective relief to the victim in all
cases, thereby permitting an individual's privacy right to be violated.253
In particular, most courts have held that qualified immunity 254 protects

probable cause before the government intrudes on an individual's right to privacy; (2) to
place a neutral magistrate judge between the competing interests of law enforcement and
individuals; (3) to define and limit the scope of the search; (4) to notify the individual to
be searched; and (5) to create a record for judicial review).
248. William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV.
881, 882 (1991) (discussing the current doctrine of warrants and the exclusionary rule, as
well as concerns over "after-the-fact judicial bias" and police perjury in the context of
obtaining warrants).
249. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). In Mapp, the U.S. Supreme
Court stated:
Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure
against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore, constitutional in
origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Id.
250. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (establishing the
Exclusionary Rule, which says that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment will not be admissible in federal court).
251. See18 U.S.C. § 2520.
252. See, e.g., Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 2001);
Garza v. Bexar Metro. Water Dist., 639 F. Supp. 2d 770, 773-74 (W.D. Tex. 2009);
Williams v. City of Tulsa, 393 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1132-33 (N.D. Okla. 2005).
253. See STEVENS & DOYLE, supra note 5, at 31.
254. Qualified immunity is "[i]mmunity from civil liability for a public official who is
performing a discretionary function, as long as the conduct does not violate clearly
established constitutional or statutory fights."

1999).

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 753 (7th ed.
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law enforcement officers from liability under § 2520.255

1003
Thus, in a

situation where a police officer illegally wiretapped the phone of an
individual, that individual would have no redress if he or she could not
sue a municipality to recover civil damages.256 Allowing this type of
illegal behavior would encourage government officials to violate
individuals' privacy rights when their law enforcement goals are deemed
paramount.25 7
In order to safeguard individual privacy rights, courts faced with
this issue should adopt the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit and hold
municipalities liable under the FWA. If the U.S. Supreme Court has the
opportunity to address this issue, it should also adopt the Sixth Circuit's
reasoning. Furthermore, courts should consider holding municipalities
liable for violations of the FWA under the theory of respondeat
superior.25 8 Endorsing the Sixth Circuit's reasoning and holding would
ensure that the goals of the FWA are effectuated.259
IV. CONCLUSION

As technology continues to improve, government officials will
undoubtedly continue to use technological advancements as a tool in
apprehending criminals. While these law enforcement objectives are
often noteworthy, maintaining individual privacy is, and always has
been, of utmost importance. Thus, consequences should follow from a
governmental intrusion on individual privacy in the form of an illegal
interception of an electronic communication, especially when liability is
supported by the FWA.
The Sixth Circuit correctly concluded that municipalities can be
held liable for violations of the FWA. The statute's text and legislative

255. E.g., Narducci v. Moore, 572 F.3d 313, 323 (7th Cir. 2009); Tapley v. Collins,
211 F.3d 1210, 1126 (1lth Cir. 2000); Blake v. Wright, 179 F.3d 1003, 1013 (6th Cir.
1999).
256. Although the FWA contains a provision that requires the exclusion of any
illegally obtained electronic communication from being used in a "trial, hearing, or other
proceeding," 18 U.S.C. § 2515, there are still situations where an individual is left
without any remedy for the government's illegal interception. For instance, police
officers often use illegally obtained electronic communications solely as an investigatory
tool, in which case § 2515 would not remedy the privacy violation. See Kaplan et al.,
supra note 6.
257. See Davis, supra note 31. The U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that excluding
illegally obtained evidence from a criminal prosecution pursuant to the Exclusionary
Rule is necessary to deter police officials from committing future Fourth Amendment
violations. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987). The civil remedy provision of
the FWA can be likened to the Exclusionary Rule in that they both deter government
officials from executing unreasonable and illegal searches and seizures.
258. See supra Part IlI.C.
259. See S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 2153 (1968).
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history support this holding. The doctrine of respondeat superior also
serves as supplementary support for municipal liability under the FWA.
In addition, holding a municipality liable under the FWA would conform
to the statute's goal of reconciling a government's law enforcement
interests with an individual's right to privacy.
Government officials would be deterred from infringing on
individuals' privacy in the wiretapping context if municipalities could be
held liable under the FWA. If courts fail to interpret the FWA as
providing civil relief against a municipality, they will effectively be
giving municipalities a windfall, especially in a jurisdiction where an
individual police officer is protected from liability by qualified
immunity. Thus, courts addressing this issue should hold municipalities
liable for violations of the FWA.

